Understanding and evaluating the robustness of neural networks against adversarial attacks is a subject of growing interest. Attacks proposed in the literature usually work with models that are trained to minimize cross-entropy loss and have softmax activations. In this work, we present interesting experimental results that suggest the importance of considering other loss functions and target representations. Specifically, (1) training on mean-squared error and (2) representing targets as codewords generated from a random codebook show a marked increase in robustness against targeted and untargeted attacks under white-box and blackbox settings. Our results show an increase in accuracy against untargeted attacks of up to 98.7% and a decrease of targeted attack success rates of up to 99.8%. For our experiments, we use the DenseNet architecture trained on three datasets (CIFAR-10, MNIST, and Fashion-MNIST) 1 .
Introduction
Neural networks are producing state-of-the-art results across a large number of domains, including image recognition ( [13] , [16] ), natural language processing ( [12] , [27] ), and speech recognition ( [26] , [10] ). Despite an everincreasing adoption of neural networks in commercial settings, recent work has shown that such algorithms are susceptible to adversarial examples, which are inputs applied with imperceptible perturbations ( [24] , [8] ). It is thus important to investigate additional vulnerabilities as well as defenses against them.
In this paper we investigate the problem of adversarial attacks on image classification systems. We explore two threat models; the white-box setting, where the attacker is aware of the target model's specifications, parameters, loss function, and target representations, and the black-box setting, where the attacker only has query access to the model. Figure 1 . Left. Adversarial images generated for the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST test datasets using a targeted Momentum Iterative Method attack ( = 0.1) on a DenseNet model with onehot target representations and softmax outputs trained to minimize cross-entropy. The attacks achieve 90.8% and 100% success rates respectively. Right. Adversarial images generated under the identical setting, but using a DenseNet model trained to minimize the mean-squared error between tanh outputs and codeword targets. The attacks achieve success rates of 2.3% and 11.4% respectively.
Our experiments show that these simple modifications can significantly increase the robustness of the model against existing targeted and untargeted attacks under both white-box and black-box adversarial settings.
Finally, we also show that the model's design breaks inherent assumptions that the Carlini & Wagner L2 (CWL2) attack makes about the target model. We thus further evaluate our proposed model's robustness by modifying the CWL2 attack to accommodate the model's design. Our results show that, while the modified attack significantly increases its efficacy against our modified model, the model trained on MSE with codeword target representations still displays more robustness compared to conventional neural network models.
Background

Neural networks
A neural network is a non-linear function F θ that maps data x ∈ R n to targets y ∈ R d , where n and d are the dimensions of the input and target spaces, respectively. θ represents the parameters of the neural network. For conventional neural networks and classification tasks, y is typically a one-hot representation of the class label and d is the number of classes in the dataset.
In this work, we use the original DenseNet architecture ( [11] ) as the existing benchmark, which has recently produced state-of-the-art results on several image datasets. We propose a modified DenseNet architecture where the softmax activation layer is replaced by a tanh activation layer that has 128 outputs (the dimension of a codeword), whereas the original DenseNet architecture produces 10 outputs (the number of classes).
Adversarial examples
The goal of an adversarial attack is to cause some misbehavior from the target neural network. In particular, [24] has shown that it is possible to construct somex by adding minimal perturbations to original input x such that
Here,x is commonly referred to as an adversarial example, while the original data x is referred to as a clean example. Apart from image classification, adversarial attacks have been proposed both in natural language and audio domains ( [5] , [2] , [31] ).
Attacks
Settings. We explore two adversarial settings, namely white-box and black-box scenarios. In the white-box setting, the attacker has access to and utilizes the model's parameters and output to generate adversarial examples. In this work, we further assume that the attacker knows what the target representations are and which loss function the model was trained to minimize. In the black-box scenario, the attacker has no access to the model's parameters and specifications other than the ability to query it.
Types. There are mainly two types of attacks. In a targeted attack, an adversary generates an adversarial example so that the target model returns some desired class t. On the other hand, in an untargeted attack, the attacker causes the model to simply return some prediction F (x) = F (x). A targeted attack is evaluated by its success rate, which is the proportion of images for which the target class was successfully predicted (the lower the better from the perspective of the model). An untargeted attack is evaluated by the accuracy of the target model, which denotes the proportion of images which failed to get misclassified (the higher the better from the perspective of the model).
The following describes the attacks used in this work.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). The Fast Gradient Sign Method [8] , one of the earliest gradient-based attacks, generates adversarial examples via:
where J is the loss function of the neural network, y t is the target class, and is a parameter which controls the magnitude of the perturbations made to the original input x. The gradient, which is taken w.r.t the input, determines which direction each pixel should be purturbed in order to minimize the loss function.
Basic Iterative Method (BIM). The Basic Iterative Method, proposed by Kurakin et al. [14] , applies FGSM iteratively to find more effective adversarial examples. In particular, the attack generates an adversarial example at iteration i via:
Momentum Iterative Method (MIM). The Momentum Iterative Method [7] combines iterative gradient-based attacks with techniques used to train neural networks more effectively, namely the accumulation of a velocity vector based on the gradient of the loss function.
L-BFGS Attack. Szegedy et al. [24] proposed the L-BFGS attack, the first targeted white-box attack on convolutional neural networks, by solving the following constrained optimization problem:
The above formulation aims to minimize two objectives; the left half measures the distance (L 2 norm) between the input and the adversarial example, while the right half represents the cross-entropy loss for some target class t and target network output F . It is used only as a targeted attack.
Deep Fool. The Deep Fool attack, proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [19] , is an attack which imagines the decision boundaries of neural networks to be linear hyperplanes and uses an iterative optimization algorithm similar to the Newton-Raphson method to find the smallest L 2 perturbation which causes a misclassification. It is used only as an untargeted attack. Carlini & Wagner L2 (CWL2) The Carlini & Wagner L2 attack [4] follows an optimization problem similar to that of L-BFGS but replaces cross-entropy with a cost function that depends on the pre-softmax logits of the network. In particular, the attack minimizes the following cost function to generate adversarial examples:
where t is the target class in a targeted attack and z(x) represents the pre-softmax logits of the network. The function assumes that the highest logit value corresponds to the most likely class, which is aligned with models that output softmax probabilities over each class.
Apart from the above white-box attacks, we also evaluate model robustness against transfer attacks,a type of blackbox attack where adversarial examples are generated using a model which the adversary has access to
Proposals
In this work we have two proposals. First, we propose changes to the conventional neural network architecture and target representations to defend against adversarial attacks described in Section 2.3. Second, we propose a modified CWL2 attack that is specifically suited for our proposed defense and is shown to be more effective than the original CWL2 attack (Section 3.3).
Training on mean-squared error
Unlike conventional neural networks that use softmax and cross-entropy loss to classify we propose to use MSE as the loss function to compute the error between the output of the modelŷ and the target y ∈ Y , where Y is the set of target representations for all classes. During inference, we select the output class for which its target representation y yields the smallest euclidean distance toŷ.
Randomized target representations
Instead of using one-hot encoding as target representations, we propose to represent each target class as a codeword from a random codebook. Specifically, the n target representations corresponding to the n classes are sampled once at the beginning of training from a uniform distribution U (−1, 1) d based on a secret key, where d is the length of each codeword. To match the representation space of the network output and the targets, the conventional softmax layer is replaced with tanh activation with d outputs.
Modified CWL2 attack
The Carlini & Wagner L2 attack makes several assumptions about the target network's architecture based on its cost function mentioned in 2.3. The function assumes that the highest pre-softmax logit value corresponds to the most likely class, which is aligned with models that output softmax probabilities over each class. However, applying our proposed neural network modifications breaks such assumptions, for the output of the network would be tanh activations and the length of the output would not correspond to the number of classes in the dataset. We thus propose a simple modification to the CWL2 attack to make it compatible with our model; in particular, our cost function considers the distance D between the logits and the targets:
Like with the Carlini & Wagner L2 attack, the cost function is designed such that f (x) = 0 if and only if the target class is returned by the model. Based on the formulations in [4] , the attack finds some w which optimizes the following objective:
where c is a trade-off constant that controls the importance of size of perturbations. Larger values of c allow for larger distortions. For our experiments, we have defined D(x, y) as the euclidean distance.
Experimental setup
In this section we describe the evaluation datasets, evaluation models and adversarial image generation process.
Datasets
CIFAR-10
CIFAR-10 [13] is a small image classification dataset with 10 classes. It contains 60,000 thumbnail-size images of dimensions 32x32x3, of which 10,000 images are withheld for testing.
MNIST
The MNIST dataset [17] is another image classification dataset containing monochromatic thumbnails (28x28) of handwritten digits. It is comprised of 60,000 training images and 10,000 testing images.
Fashion-MNIST
Finally, the Fashion-MNIST dataset [29] is a relatively new image classification dataset containing thumbnail images of 10 different types of clothing (shoes, shirts, etc.) and has the same dimensions as those of MNIST. To our knowledge, this is the first work which uses this dataset to evaluate adversarial robustness.
Models evaluated
We use three variants of the DenseNet model [11] , which has recently produced state-of-the-art results on several image datasets:
• O:SOFTMAX:CE refers to a DenseNet model with softmax activations trained on cross-entropy loss and one-hot target representation.
• O:SOFTMAX:MSE refers to a DenseNet model with softmax activations trained on MSE and one-hot target representation.
• R:TANH:MSE refers to a DenseNet model with tanh activations trained on MSE using codeword target representations. We used a codeword length of d = 128.
We evaluated the robustness of the R:TANH:MSE model with different codeword lengths (64, 256, and 1024) but found no significant difference in the results.
Generating adversarial examples
In this section we describe the process and parameter choices in generating the adversarial examples for all the attacks listed in Table 1 .
For each dataset mentioned in 4. 
Adapting attacks to our proposed techniques
The attacks described in 2.3 are implemented using the Cleverhans library [20] . By default, the attacks assume that the model outputs softmax predictions and that the targets are represented as one-hot vectors. Hence the internal loss function for some attacks (e.g. gradient-based iterative attacks) is predefined as cross-entropy.
Because the cross-entropy loss function is not compatible with the R:TANH:MSE model, we have adapted the 
Experimental observations
In this section we present and analyze the performance of the evaluation models under different attack scenarios; targeted attacks (Section 5.3), untargeted attacks (Section 5.2), black-box attacks (Section 5.4), and our modified CWL2 attack (Section 3.3). Benchmark performance on the original datasets is presented in Section 5. Table 4 . Robustness of each model against each targeted white-box attack. The table above reports the success rates (the lower the better) of each attack. Table 5 . Accuracy on clean test data for each dataset. Table 7 compares our proposed attack with the Carlini & Wagner L2 attack. The results show that our attack maintains its efficacy against O:SOFTMAX:CE models while significantly increasing its efficacy towards the R:TANH:MSE model. We note that increasing the ini-tial constant for our attack yields increased success rates, which is aligned with the intuition that the parameter controls the importance of the attack's success as highlighted in 3.3. However, we also observe that, despite the increase in the attack's success rate, the R:TANH:MSE model displays more robustness compared to the O:SOFTMAX:CE model. 
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Distortion vs. performance
Other related work
Several defenses have also been proposed. To date, the most effective defense technique is adversarial training ( [15] , [28] , [23] , [25] ), where the model is trained on a mix of clean and adversarial data. This has shown to provide a regularization effect that makes models more robust towards attacks.
Papernot et al. proposed defensive distillation [21] , a mechanism whereby a model is trained based on soft labels generated by another "teacher" network in order to prevent overfitting. Other methods include introducing randomness to or applying transformations on the input data and/or the layers of the network ( [9] , [6] , [22] , [30] ). However, Athalye et al. have identified in [3] that the apparent robustness of several defenses can be attributed to the introduction of computation and transformations that mask the gradients and thus break existing attacks that rely on gradients to generate adversarial examples. Their work demonstrates that small, tailored modifications to the attacks can circumvent these defenses completely.
Conclusion
We have reported interesting experimental results demonstrating the adversarial robustness of models that do not follow conventional specifications. In particular, we have evaluated models that were trained to minimize the mean-squared error between tanh activations and codeword target representations. In our experiments, the modified models displayed a marked increase in robustness towards existing targeted and untargeted attacks under white-box and black-box settings. We have also introduced a modified CWL2 attack which accommodates the specifications of the R:TANH:MSE model. While our modified attack is more effective against the modified model, the R:TANH:MSE model still demonstrates better robustness compared to the O:SOFTMAX:CE model. Future work would evaluate the robustness of models that combine our proposed modifications with other defense techniques such as adversarial training. We also wish to investigate the theoretical justifications of our proposed modifications and the results they have produced. We hope this work can help uncover further insight on making neural networks more secure as well as expand our assumptions of machine learning system designs.
